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
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8 September 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR:



Planning Group

At the termination of the Planning Group there was no convenient opportunity for me to make a departing comment. Accordingly, I post this note.

Possibly like some of you I entered the planning exercise with reservations about my capabilities for this project. At the conclusion some of these doubts have been reaffirmed.

However that may be, I must testify that it was an extraordinarily interesting and, for me, beneficial exercise. Most importantly, I feel that in a very large measure the report reflects the ideas and contributions of all of you as well as of It has been stimulating to become acquainted with most of you in ways hitherto outside my experience. It has been rewarding as well as extremely encouraging as one looks to the future of the Agency. I have increased respect for you as individuals.

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
Accept, please, my apologies for any unnecessary work I may have caused you and any circumstance in which I raised my voice.

I will remember with pleasure and satisfaction both the experience as a whole and most particularly my experience with each of you.

Best of luck on the next plan.

Yours,

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[REDACTED]

16 July 1965

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1. The continued drive toward nationalism and non-alignment with East and West on the part of smaller countries, the resultant formation of other blocs, and the political and economic impact of these changes will:

- a. increase the need for world-wide political and economic intelligence;
- b. increase the need for covert action programs in support of U.S. aims;
- c. increase the need for covert collection of political and economic intelligence; and

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d. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. At the same time there will be increasing attention to the threat posed by Communist China, to the gradual proliferation of nuclear and other advanced weapons, and to the continuing requirement for a major intelligence program against the USSR. These pressures will:

- a. cause the U.S. to maintain priority intelligence efforts against Soviet and Chinese Communist scientific and military programs;
- b. call for increased technical collection and analytical programs; and
- c. require a massive research program against China similar to that placed on the Soviet Union from 1950 on.

3. Within the context of the above, the following assumptions are made concerning the future of CIA.

a. No dramatic changes will be seen in the Agency's mission -- i.e., abrupt discontinuance of any major functions now being carried out and no completely new functions being added.

b. However, over the years, the changing world situation and the increasing reliance on machines and gadgets for collection against military advanced weaponry and related targets will bring about gradual changes in emphasis in CIA's programs.

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c. The Government's intelligence research and analysis (basic, current, and estimative) will require expansion -- principally against Communist China, but also on areas such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America -- and CIA will be looked to as the principal intelligence producer. The primary areas of expansion in CIA's research and analysis will be in the political, economic, scientific and sociological-environmental fields, although a modest effort will be devoted to military subjects in order to support the DCI. It is assumed that there will be a reconsolidation of research and analysis on a geographical basis in order better to meet intelligence obligations in a world consisting of several major and minor power centers.

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d. The growth and spread of modern weapons will require increased technical collection capabilities, [REDACTED]

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e. CIA will retain the responsibility for establishing and operating covert technical collection sites, by virtue of its mission, desire and experience; and attempts will be made by CIA to assume such activities now being carried out by DOD elements. The Agency's investment in this area may increase four-fold by 1975.

f. The development and operation of satellites, other exotic means of overhead collection and large land-based facilities will fall more and more to the Department of Defense because of the size and expense of the efforts involved, the existence of similar large scale and related DOD programs, and because to a large extent such operations would be based in the U. S. or in U. S. possessions [REDACTED]

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g. The trend toward large, complex and expensive technical collection devices and systems will call for large, automated processing and read-out facilities. There will be pressures for these facilities to be operated by the department possessing (i. e., financing) the collection system, rather than to expand the operations of national centers such as NSA and NPIC.

h. Photo and other image collection and interpretation will continue to increase rapidly in volume and value through the 1966-1970 period, but will level off and remain fairly constant following this period. It is likely that the size and expense of maintaining interpretation capabilities and the close relationship of interpretation processes to other intelligence analysis processes (e. g., economic and scientific intelligence analysis) will in the near future result in an examination of ways for most effective integration of these processes. It is assumed, however, as in the case of SIGINT processing, that because of the technical and specialized nature of imagery interpretation, it will remain centralized and separate from other functions.

i. CIA's covert collection of political and economic intelligence will expand somewhat in non-Communist countries, but should level off by the mid-1970s.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There will be increasing competition for resources for agent vs. technical covert collection.

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k. It is difficult to foresee a time when the execution of U. S. foreign policy will not depend in some measure on covert political, psychological, and paramilitary actions. The assumption must be made that the Soviets and Chinese will increase subversive pressures especially in areas where exploding populations and rising expectations outrun the capabilities of local governments who find that they cannot even keep order, let alone rule effectively. The task of building a better world is immensely more difficult than tearing down what has been built. The protracted struggle will continue to demand the exercise of covert pressures on individuals, groups, and populations not only to counteract subversion but also to promote the positive objectives of the U. S. and its allies.

Media operations will increase in size and sophistication. They will be influenced by the new communications media (satellites, TV et al) which are about to be thrust upon the world.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

"Little" wars are likely to increase in frequency, unless and until it can be shown that they do not pay. The U. S. will strive to avoid overt participation in such conflicts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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